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Abstract: Truthmaker  theorists  typically  claim  not  only  that  all  truths  have  truthmakers
(Truthmaker Maximalism), but also that there is some enlightening metaphysical theory to be
given of the nature of those truthmakers (e.g. that they are Armstrongian states of affairs, or
tropes, or concrete individuals). Call this latter thesis the "Material Theory Thesis" (it is the
thesis that there is some true material theory of truthmakers). I argue that the Material Theory
Thesis is inconsistent with Truthmaker Maximalism.
1 Classical Truthmaker Theory
What I will “Classical Truthmaker Theory” consists of the following two theses:
Truthmaker Maximalism. Every truth has a truthmaker. For purposes of this paper, I'm going to
assume the “existence-entailment” account of truthmaking – that if a truth  p has a truthmaker f,
then, necessarily, if f exists, p is true. In earlier work  (Parsons 1999; 2005) I've called this view
“truthmaker essentialism”, but it is now widely accepted as part of what is meant by “truthmaker”.
My arguments in this paper will all work on the weaker conception of truthmaking I recommended
on which if a truth p has a truthmaker f, then, f is intrinsically such that p is true.
The Material Theory Thesis. There is a some substantive metaphysical theory - a “material theory of
truthmakers”, which, for each truthmaker f, and each truth p that f makes true, explains the fact that
f makes p true, and does so in terms of the nature of f.
This, second, thesis deserves more explanation. Most truthmaker theorists (and it is these whom I
call “classical truthmaker theorists”) are not content to claim that for each truth there is a truthmaker
and leave it at that. They want to theorise about the nature of the truthmakers; for example, David
Armstrong famously believed that truthmakers are complex entities of a particular kind that he
called “states of affairs” (Armstrong 1997); other truthmaker theorists favour tropes, or “moments”
– particularised properties – as truthmakers (Mulligan, Simons, and Smith 1984); I myself tried to
defend the view that ordinary concrete particulars can play the truthmaker role  (Parsons 1999).
These theories about the nature of truthmakers outrun the thesis of truthmaker maximalism; they are
part of what Armstrong called the “material theory of truthmakers” as opposed to the “formal theory
of truthmakers” (the existence-entailment account, and Truthmaker Maximalism itself, belong to the
latter). Material theories of truthmakers are theories about the nature of those entities that play the
truthmaker role (Are they complex? If so, what are their constituents? Are they simple? Are they
abstract, or concrete? How do they relate to ordinary concrete particulars?). Such theorising must be
constrained – it would be a poor material theory of truthmakers that said that an Armstrongian state
of affairs in which the Eiffel tower and the colour red are the sole constituents makes true the truth
that Socrates is snub-nosed. The constraint, I take it,  is that a material theory of truthmakers is
intended to explain how it is that the truthmakers make true the truths that they do.
As a  paradigm of such an explanation,  let's  look at  Armstrong's  theory as  it  applies to  simple
subject-predicate truths. Let Rosie be a red rose. Consider the truth “Rosie is red”. On Armstrong's
view, the truthmaker for this is the state of affairs of Rosie's being red – a complex entity with two
constituents: the universal redness, and a substratum, which we'll call “thin Rosie”. Thin Rosie is
what states of affairs that make some truth “about Rosie” true all have in common. Thin Rosie,
however, cannot properly be said to be red; she is a “bare particular” with no properties at all. What
we normally call “Rosie” – Thick Rosie – is a complex conjunctive state of affairs which has as its
constituents all the states of affairs in which Thin Rosie is a constituent.
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Armstrong's theory of states of affairs offers a distinctive analysis of instantiation. To instantiate a
universal is to have it as a constituent (or perhaps, to be more careful, to have it as a constituent in
the right way1). So it follows from this analysis and from the description of the nature of the state of
affairs of Rosie's being red that that state of affairs is red. It also follows that Thick Rosie is red
(since the constituent-of relation is transitive, and redness is the right sort of constituent of Thick
Rosie). So Armstrong's theory in this case  explains why the state of affairs of Rosie's being red
makes it true that Rosie is red. Indeed it does so in a very strict sense of “explains”: we can think of
Armstrong as offering a Hempelian covering law explanation – a valid argument whose premises
consist of a covering law (the analysis of instantiation) together with particular facts (a description
of the constituents of the state of affairs in question). (Hempel 1966, chap. 5)
Armstrong's material theory is not the only one available, of course. But other theories follow the
same pattern. The purpose of positing a material theory of truthmakers is to make it plausible that
the things being posited can do the truthmaking required. And this “making it plausible” is exactly
the  idea  behind  Hempel's  model  of  explanation.  Armstrong's  explanations  cite  an  analysis  of
instantiation and the constituents of states of affairs as the explanans. Alternative material theories
(say, theories on which truthmakers are tropes) might offer different explanans (tropes are simple,
so they do not have constituents)  – but the same game is  being played:  the trope theorist  will
explain why Rosie's  redness trope makes it  true that  Rosie  is  red by appeal  to  a covering law
concerning tropes in general, and a thesis about the nature of Rosie's redness trope, namely that it is
a redness trope and belongs to Rosie. If properly stated these theses should entail that Rosie is red,
thus explaining how that trope makes true the truth it does.
The Material  Theory Thesis  then,  is  the view that  some such explanation is  possible for every
truthmaker;  conjoined with  Truthmaker  Maximalism,  this  entails  that  some such explanation is
possible for every truth. It is this last consequence that I believe is false – indeed, necessarily false –
so the Material Theory Thesis and Truthmaker Maximalism are jointly inconsistent.
2 The inconsistency of the Material Theory Thesis with Maximalism
There  are  many  arguments  against  Truthmaker  Maximalism in  the  literature  –  arguments  that
certain kinds of truths do not, or cannot, have truthmakers. A popular case is that of certain kinds of
universally quantified truths – the problem, as it is known, of general facts. Truthmaker Maximalists
reply, in turn, by offering accounts of what makes these universally quantified truths true; accounts
which anti-maximalists then reject as inconsistent or implausible. My aim is to take a step beyond
this debate – my argument is that, no matter what form the correct material theory of truthmaking
takes, it cannot explain why the truthmaker for some general fact makes it true. This is because
material  theories of truthmaking are theories  about  the natures of truthmakers,  and a statement
about the nature of a truthmaker cannot entail that a fully general truth is true.
Before I state that argument, though, I'd like to quickly review the problem of general facts, as I
understand it; and to remove from consideration some other issues that are often confused with it,
and some partial solutions that do not work in full generality.
1 This is to deal with a number of apparent counterexamples to the thesis that to instantiate a universal is to have it as 
a constituent, including but not limited to: (a) Higher-order states of affairs – on Armstrong's analysis of laws of 
nature, the truthmaker for a law is a state of affairs which has as its constituents two universals that are lawfully 
correlated and a higher-order necessitating relation. But we don't want to say that the truthmaker for Columb's law 
is itself charged (or do we?). Presumably this is because it has the universal charge as a constituent in a different 
way from the way that truthmaker for “Rosie is charged” has it. (b) It's unclear how the constituent relationships 
between states of affairs interact with the mereological relationships between thick particulars. The door of my 
house is red, so it has redness as a constituent. But my house has the door as a part – does that mean that my house 
has redness as a constituent? If so, then it has redness as a constituent in the “wrong” way, as my house is not red 
(or at least not red all over).
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2.1 General facts
Probably the first discussion of the problem of general facts occurs in Bertrand Russell's Lectures
on Logical Atomism (Russell 1985). Russell points out that the conjunctive fact that makes true, for
each man x, that x is mortal does not make true the truth that all men are mortal. This is because the
existence of the conjunctive fact (and its making true the corresponding conjunction) is consistent
with the existence of some additional man who is not mortal. Russell concludes that there must be
irreducibly general  facts  –  facts  that  make true  universally quantified truths  (e.g.  “all  men are
mortal”) – but which are not reducible to, or as we might say, supervenient on, any collection of
particular facts – facts which make true subject-predicate truths (e.g. “Socrates is mortal”).
Truthmaker  theorists  have  dealt  with  this  problem in  three  different  ways:  (a)  by  abandoning
Truthmaker Maximalism, substituting some weaker doctrine such as Bigelow's  (1988, 132–134)
“supervenience of Truth on Being”; (b) by arguing that Russell was mistaken, that there are ways to
reduce general facts  to particular ones; (c)  by accepting Russell's  conclusion and taking on the
burden of explaining what  the truthmakers  for general  facts  are.  This last  is  the path taken by
Armstrong, who devotes chapter 13 of his (1997) to just such an explanation.
Of these three, strategy (a) need not detain us. My argument is that Truthmaker Maximalism is
inconsistent with the Material Theory Thesis; it's  a perfectly good response to that argument to
reject Truthmaker Maximalism; so I have no objection to (a). It's the impossibility of strategy (c)
that I am concerned with. In order that we may focus on that, I will briefly say something about (b).
I can't enumerate and answer all of the ways in which a philosopher might possibly use strategy (b).
That  should  be  unnecessary,  however;  Russell's  argument  stands  on  its  own.  Resisting  most
versions of strategy (b) is simply a matter of restating the argument, perhaps with a clearer example.
A common version of (b) is the suggestion that the world as a whole makes true all general facts.
Cheyne and Pigden (2006), for example, say that the fact that the world has the intrinsic nature it
actually does makes it true that there are no unicorns – the idea being that if there were unicorns, the
world  would  have  to  have  the  property  of  containing  unicorns,  an  intrinsic  property  which  it
actually lacks.2 This however ignores the fact that one way there could be unicorns is if the thing
that is actually the world were one of two island universes, the other of which contained unicorns.
This is simply an application of Russell's argument over again. The world's being the way it actually
is may make it true that there are no unicorns in the world; but it does not make it true that that is
the only world there is; therefore it does not make it  true that there are no unicorns  tout court
(Parsons 2006).
One point that comes out of this discussion that that not every universally quantified truth gives rise
to Russell's argument – some universally quantified truths could be made true by a truthmaker for
some particular matter of fact. For example, the truth that there is no unicorn in my office (or for
that matter, in the world) could be made true by the fact that my office (resp. the world) and its
contents are arranged as they actually are. This is because it is extremely plausible that, as a matter
of metaphysical necessity, my office could not be arranged as it actually is, and contain a unicorn.
There is a very plausible connection between what sorts of parts an individual has and its intrinsic
nature. So universally quantified truths that restrict themselves to the parts of some individual need
no  irreducibly  general  truthmakers.  I'll  reserve  the  term  “general  truth”  for  those  universally
quantified truths that do not have this feature, and “general fact” for whatever makes true a general
truth.
Perhaps there is one way that strategy (b) can work: one could deny that it is a contingent matter
which things there are.3 Then Russell's counterexample wouldn't work, because there couldn't have
2 For a similar, but earlier, attempt, see (Simons 1992).
3 Arguably, this is the view of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. The underlying assumption here, that there could not have 
been anything other than what there actually is, has been held by Linsky and Zalta (1994) and, more recently, and 
on similar grounds, Williamson (2013).
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been an extra non-mortal man in addition to all the the things there are actually are. It would take us
beyond the scope of this paper to fully evaluate this option. Besides its prima facie implausibility, it
essentially just shifts the problem of general facts to be a special case of the problem of finding
truthmakers for necessary truths – and at the same time, it makes this problem harder, because the
believer in necessity of existence must believe that there are some highly substantive necessary
truths, namely, those concerning the cardinality of the world. 
2.2 The impossibility of a material theory of general facts
Let us proceed then, to strategy (c). Armstrong's theory of states of affairs is, as before, a useful
example. He embraces Russell's conclusion that there are irreducibly general facts, and proceeds to
give  a  material  theory of  their  nature.  Armstrong already believes,  for  independent  reasons,  in
higher-order states of affairs. These are states of affairs which have no substratum as a constituent,
but in which universals or states of affairs themselves play the role that would normally be played
by a substratum. Laws of nature, for example, on his view, posit relations between universals; they
are made true by a state of affairs  whose only constituents are universals  and the higher-order
relation of necessitation. Armstrong proposes that the truthmakers of general truths are an additional
species  of  higher-order  state  of  affairs,  involving  a  universal,  the  aggregate  of  all  particulars
instantiating it, and the higher-order relation of totalling. Each such state of affairs makes it true that
that aggregate contains all the instances of that universal. (Armstrong 1997, 199)
There are a couple of internal problems with this view that I would like to put to one side. First,
Armstrong's view works best with restricted universal truths. The fact that all men are mortal is
made true by the conjunctive states of affairs of that conjoins, for each man x, the state of affairs of
x's being mortal, and in addition, the totality states of affairs of those being the totality of the men.
Fine; but what about the truth that there are no more than  n things (where  n is the number of
actually existing things)? This is a general truth, but it doesn't fit the model of there being some
aggregate  object  that  is  the totality of  instances  of  some universal  –  there  is  no Armstrongian
universal of thinghood, existence, or self-identity. 
Armstrong does allow himself to speak of the property of self-identity, though he denies that it is a
universal. He could generalise his view of totality states of affairs to allow that they may have
properties (as opposed to universals) as constituents.4 That would, however, be inconsistent with his
other  commitments.  What  Armstrong means  by “property”  (when these are  distinguished from
universals) is a way things might be that does not give rise to a respect of resemblance, and talk of
which  may  be  analysed  away  in  terms  of  universals  –  properties  are  either  universals  or
“ontological free lunches” in his terminology  (Armstrong 1997, 12–13). If the property of self-
identity is to play a role as a constituent in the irreducible general fact that “those are all things there
are”, a role that cannot be played by any universal, then it is not an ontological free lunch.
Second, Armstrong's view that aggregates (rather than classes) are a relatum of the totalling relation
leads to trouble. Consider a world w in which there are eight identical tin cubes of 1m width each,
and  these  are  the  only tin  cubes  that  there  are,  and that  they  are  scattered  around  the  world.
Supposing that the property of being a tin cube is a universal, then the fact that there are no more
than four tin statues is the totality state of affairs constituted by the universal of being a tin cube, the
aggregate of the tin cubes, and the totalling relation. This state of affairs fails however, to make true
the truth that there are no more than four tin cubes, because that very state of affairs could co-exist
with a fifth tin statue in the following way. Consider a world w' in which those very cubes have
been arranged into the shape of a 2m width cube, and all else remains the same. In w', the very same
4 Indeed, Armstrong appears to do this: in discussing a different objection, he says in passing that “the [totalling] 
relation is supposed to hold between a property... (second class [i.e. non-universal] properties... being of course 
allowable) and an aggregate” (1997, 200). The parenthesised passage in quote makes the generalisation I am 
discussing. But he doesn't give a way of resolving the problem I mention in the text.
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aggregate is the totality of all the tin cubes as in w, but w' it comprises five cubes – the original four
1m width cube and the one 2m width cube they compose.5
The obvious thing to do here is to replace Armstrong's use of aggregates with classes – for while the
aggregate of all the tin statues is the same in w' as in w, the class of all the tin statues is different.
Again, however, this creates problems elsewhere in Armstrong's metaphysics – he has his reasons
for wanting aggregates rather than classes to play this role.6
These two problems are ad hominems against Armstrong; I mention them only to set them aside. A
third  problem,  however,  generalises  to  any version  of  strategy (c)  –  it  is  an  problem for  any
combination of Truthmaker Maximalism with the Material Theory Thesis. In order to explain it, I'll
first present it as an objection to Armstrong's account of totality states of affairs, and then show how
it generalises.
The problem is this: even in the best cases, Armstrong's description of a totality state of affairs fails
to explain why that totality state of affairs makes true the proposition(s) it does. Armstrong's theory
gives us an account of the nature – the intrinsic properties and constituents – of a totality state of
affairs; but no such description can  entail that something other than that state of affairs does not
exist. So, there is a state of affairs consisting of a certain aggregate, the totalling relation, and the
universal being a rose; that description doesn't entail that everything disjoint from that aggregate is
not a rose. Nor could any description of the nature of a general fact do so – let the general facts be
tropes, or perfectly simple and unanalysable, or whatever – no material theory of general facts is
possible,  because  it  is  not  possible  for  the  description of  the  nature of  an entity to  entail  that
something else doesn't exist.
That's the argument in outline: it has two important suppressed premises that I need to defend. First,
I've assumed a broadly Hempelian account of explanation, on which an explanans must entail its
explanandum.  I  don't  think  that  this  is  too  much  to  insist  on  here,  for  material  theories  of
truthmaking do explain the truthmaking role of particular facts in this sense, as I argued in section
1. Moreover, less austere theories of explanation, causal or probabilistic theories for example, are
not appropriate in the metaphysical case. In any case, I believe that my argument would also go
through on more modern accounts of explanation, for example, unification accounts.7
Second, I've assumed that no covering law can help bridge the explanatory gap between the nature
of general facts and their truthmaking role. In the case of particular facts, I allowed that Armstrong's
explanation appeals to an analysis of instantiation as a covering law that connects the having of
redness as a constituent (in the right way) with being red (and I assumed that other material theories
of truthmakers will do something similar). Why cannot a similar covering law connect the nature of
a totality state of affairs with its being such that those are all the men? 
One answer that I might give is a Humean, metaphysical one: any such covering law would be
metaphysically queer: it would correlate, with at least metaphysical necessity, an intrinsic property
of  a  truthmaker  with  an  extrinsic  one;  it  would  be  a  necessary  connection  between  distinct
existences.8 This is not true of Armstrong's analysis of instantiation; but it would have to be true of
any covering law that helped explain the truthmaking role of totality states of affairs.
5 This argument is a descendent of Quine's “triangles” (1950, sec. 3) argument that not all all properties can be 
identified with aggregates (as opposed to classes).
6 Though I must admit I find it difficult to understand what those reasons are. I suspect it is because he wants to 
reduce classes to aggregates of states of affairs (of a certain kind) in a way that is incompatible with classes being 
constituents of totality states of affairs. Armstrong's theory of classes has a lot of problems of its own – more, if we 
may count problems, than his theory of states of affairs – so it is hard to tell whether the proposed revision makes 
his overall system better or worse. 
7 For which, see Kitcher (1989).
8 This was the premise I used in a related argument for the insolubility of the problem of general facts in my (2005); 
as I explain below, I am not using it here.
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A better answer is explanatory: there is no reason to choose any one such law over any other. The
proposed covering law simply says that if there is there is a totality state of affairs of a certain kind,
then those are all the men. Armstrong's material theory of general facts is idle, since all it does is
engage the antecedent  of  the covering law. He could  equally well  have  said,  like  Cheyne and
Pigden, that the world as a whole makes true all general truths, and that there is a metaphysically
necessary covering law to the effect that if the world is as it actually is, then there are no more men
than there actually are. (Or, like the perverse theory I mentioned in section 1 in order to motivate
the Material Theory Thesis, that state of affairs in which the Eiffel tower and the colour red are the
sole constituents makes true all general truths, and that there is a metaphysically necessary covering
law to that effect).
2.3 Mighty biceps?
My argument here may seem to resemble another argument against a another view of Armstrong's:
David  Lewis's  (1983) “Mighty  Biceps”  argument.  The  target  in  this  case  is  Armstrong's  non-
Humean and necessitarian theory of laws, according to which a law of nature (say, Coulomb's Law,
which describes the force with which charged objects attract or repel one another) is both distinct
from, and, in some sense, makes necessary, the corresponding regularity (the fact that all charged
objects behave as Coulomb's Law predicts). In Armstrong's view, laws consist in  a higher-order
“necessitation” relation holding between two universals; they are, like totality facts, higher order
states of affairs. Lewis's criticism is this: why should the existence of such a state of affairs ensure
that whatever instantiates one universal instantiates the other? There is a rhetorical slight of hand
here: just because the relation is called “necessitation” doesn't entail that it  deserves that name.
(Lewis  quips  that  just  because  a  man is  called  “Armstrong” doesn't  entail  that  he  has  mighty
biceps).
I agree with the point about avoiding the rhetorical trick (as does Armstrong: in his later work, he is
careful  to  call  the  necessitation  relation  “N”,  and  the  totalling  relation,  “T”).  But  neither  my
argument nor Lewis's is restricted to making that point alone. Lewis must go on to argue that the
existence  of  an  Armstrongian  law-fact  does  not necessitate  the  obtaining  of  the  corresponding
regularity (which he does  on metaphysical,  Humean,  grounds).  I  must  go on to  argue that  the
existence  of  an  Armstrongian  totality-fact  does  not  explain  the  obtaining  of  the  corresponding
general truth (which I do on quite different grounds).
The point to notice here is that insofar as my argument resembles Lewis's, it is not because of any
shared commitment to Humean metaphysics. One might be tempted to re-read Lewis's arguments
for Humeanism in the light of my arguments from explanation – in effect to argue from premises
about the nature of metaphysical explanation to metaphysical Humeanism. But that would be a very
grand project indeed and I am not sure that it would succeed.
2.4 Metaphysical explanation?
It's fashionable these days to hold that there is an autonomous type of metaphysical explanation,
distinct from deductive-nomological explanation, and distinct from any type of explanation given in
the sciences (but analogous to causal explanation). If this is so, then an important premise of my
argument is false. It may of course still be that my conclusion is true – that a material theory of
general facts is impossible by the standards of metaphysical explanation (whatever they are). That is
unlikely, however, because these theories of metaphysical explanation have been carefully crafted to
give metaphysicians work to do – to predict that the explanations actually given by metaphysicians
(truthmaker theorists included) are good explanations. That, in itself, is reason to be skeptical. The
fashion for metaphysical explanation seems to me to be a pernicious great leap backwards into a
pre-scientific, “first philosophy” mode of thinking, in which metaphysics has its own set of rules,
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autonomous from any other type of inquiry. It leaves metaphysics too unconstrained to be worth
doing.
I'm aware I may be sounding like a positivist.  But we should all agree with the positivists that
unconstrained theorising is  bad; some questions  are idle – perhaps the question of whether the
Nothing noths, or perhaps the question of whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the
Son together or from the Father alone. The positivists' mistake was to suppose that it should be easy
to determine which questions are idle on apriori grounds.9 Relatedly, the positivists tacitly (and
hypocritically) accepted their own apriori first philosophy. The verification principle in fact makes
very bad predictions concerning which statements are meaningful – existentialist and theological
discourse do not  appear to be mere nonsense – but, of course,  the positivists  didn't  accept the
principle  on  empirical  grounds.  Rather,  they  accepted  it  for  the  same  bad  reasons  that  many
metaphysicians now accept autonomous metaphysical explanation: because it gave them work to do
– the work of denouncing large swathes of philosophy as meaningless.
I do not want to repeat that error. I reject the theory of autonomous metaphysical explanation not
because  it  gives  me  an  excuse  to  commit  works  of  metaphysics  to  the  flames,  but  because
explanation must be univocal. What we are trying to do in metaphysics is the same as, in some
general way – and not just analogous to – what theoretical scientists and mathematicians are trying
to do. There must therefore be a unified theory of explanation, and the Hempelian model is closer to
that than any theory of autonomous metaphysical explanation.
3 Whither truthmaker theory?
Suppose that my argument has been correct so far; suppose that it is impossible to give a material
theory  of  general  facts,  and  so  the  Material  Theory  Thesis  is  inconsistent  with  Truthmaker
Maximalism. How should truthmaker theory proceed?
There are two options: either reject Maximalism, or reject the Material Theory Thesis (or both, of
course).  Suppose  we  reject  Maximalism.  That  seems  the  most  reasonable  option  to  me.  I'm
impressed by the ability of Armstrong's theory (and others like it) to explain why states of affairs
make true the propositions that they do, even on the very austere sense of explanation that I have
demanded.   However,  without  Maximalism,  truthmaker  theory  doesn't  seem  very  useful  or
interesting. The point of truthmaker theory is supposed to be to force us not to shirk metaphysical
responsibilities, or to not rest content with theories such as Rylean behaviourism that appear to do
so. But without Maximalism it's easy for any shirker to say “Oh, that's just another kind of truth that
lacks a truthmaker.” 
Suppose,  on  the  other  hand,  we reject  the  Material  Theory Thesis.  I  can't  survey all  possible
truthmaker theories that do this, but I suspect that they all involve another kind of shirking. As an
example, consider the following type of truthmaker theory, that some people appear to hold. This
view rejects  the existence-entailment account of truthmaking that  I  have been assuming in this
paper. It holds that truthmakers cannot properly be said to exist or not exist at all; rather they obtain
or don't obtain. Nor does it make sense to ask about the constituents or nature of truthmakers – these
questions, on this view, commit a category mistake, treating facts as if they were things. All that can
be said about a fact, on this view, is that it is the fact that such-and-such; that it obtains; or that it
doesn't obtain. That's a way of rejecting the Material Theory Thesis; but it's far gone in shirking of
metaphysical responsibilities. This is no theory of truthmakers at all, but the determination to carry
on talking about them without any accompanying desire to take such talk seriously. Such a view is
incapable of critiquing Rylean behaviourism and its fellow travellers; it is itself one of them. I'm
guessing that any truthmaker theory that rejects the Material Theory Thesis will feel a bit like that.
9 A mistake, which I fear, has not left the world – see (McLeod and Parsons 2013).
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